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Abstract
We incorporate signaling scheme into Ad Auction setting, to achieve
better welfare and revenue while protect users’ privacy. We propose a
new K-anonymous signaling scheme setting, prove the hardness of the
corresponding welfare/revenue maximization problem, and finally propose
the algorithms to approximate the optimal revenue or welfare.
1 Introduction
In real ad Exchange market, auctioneer and bidders will have long term busi-
ness. On the one hand, leaking impression’s information will reduce bidders’
competition and thus lose revenue. For example, advertisers usually favor a
certain category of users, companies selling football kits only wish to advertise
to soccer fans. When the search engine informs the advertiser that the user is a
soccer fan, only football companies are willing to bid, which leads to a thinner
market and less revenue for the search engine. On the other hand, this will
also do harm to users’ privacy protection, which is a highly important issue in
Internet business. Therefore, it is important to protect users’ privacy and hide
information of coming impressions.
In order to raise the revenue while protecting privacy, we can inform that
the user belongs to a ball game category irrespective of his interest in soccer,
basketball, or tennis. Most of the sports companies will bid for this user, lead-
ing to higher revenue for the search engine. In the mathematical model, we
constrained the support (soccer, basketball, tennis, etc) of the categories (ball
game) to be larger than K and our objective is to build up the type (soccer)
to category (ball game) map that enables the search engine to achieve the best
welfare/revenue.
In section 2, we propose the specific setting of the problem. In section 3, we
firstly prove that it is NP-hard to solve K-anonymous signaling welfare maxi-
mization problem and it cannot be approximated in factor less than e/(e− 1).
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Then we give a 2e/(e − 1) approximation algorithms. Finally, we propose sev-
eral special settings that can be solved optimally in polynomial time. In section
4, we prove the NP-Hardness of revenue maximization, and give a method to
transfer welfare maximization approximation result into revenue approximation.
In section 5, we note the possible future work.
2 Problem Formulation
There is one impression coming for auction, the impression belongs to one of m
category, the prior probability that the impression belongs to the ith category
is pi. The ith bidder of n bidders values the jth category as vij . Auctioneer
will broadcast a signal S after knowing the impression’s category and raise
a second price auction. The map between categories and signals is public to
bidders. Denote φ(j, S) as the probability that auctioneer will broadcast signal
S when category is j. In this setting, φ(j, S) ∈ {0, 1}. Finally, auctioneer
wants to construct the best map that can extract the most revenue or social
welfare, while satisfies that each signal’s support(categories that will broadcast
this signal) supφ,S = {j : φ(j, S) = 1} is equal or larger than K.
Without K-constraint, the model is a typical pure signaling scheme men-
tioned in [3]. For a signal S, the probability of broadcasting S is
∑
j pjφ(j, S).
Given the auctioneer broadcasting S, the probability that the category is j is
Pr[j|S] = pjφ(j, S)/(
∑
j′ pj′φ(j
′, S). The expected welfare achieved by broad-
casting S is
max
i
{E[vi|S]} = maxi{
∑
j vi,jpjφ(j, S)∑
j pjφ(j, S)
}
Therefore, the objective is to find a map φ that satisfies K-constraint to maxi-
mize ∑
S
Pr[S] max
i
{E[vi|S]} =
∑
S
max
i
{
∑
j
(vi,jpj)φ(j, S)}
We use Vi,j to describe vi,jpj for simplicity later. The revenue maximization
problem is similar by replacing maximum with the second maximum since sec-
ond price auction is truthful in this setting.
We observe that this problem is equivalent to the bundling scheme problem:
there are m items for sale, bidders have different value to different item. The
task is to partition items into several bundles, each bundle has size at least K.
Then auctioneer sells bundles separately by second price auction. The goal of
auctioneer is to maximize social welfare/revenue.
3 Welfare Maximization
In this section we firstly prove the NP-Hardness of welfare maximization prob-
lem and prove it cannot be approximated in factor less than e/(e−1). Then we
give a 2e/(e− 1) approximation algorithms. Finally, we propose several special
settings that can be solved optimally in polynomial time.
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3.1 Hardness Results
When both number of signals used and bundle size have no constraint, welfare
maximization problem is trivial by giving category j impression to bidder who
values it most. However, when signal number is constrained (Cardinality Con-
strained Signaling Problem), or each signal’s support size has to be no less than
K (K-anonymous Signaling Problem), the problem becomes NP-Hard.
We prove the NP-Hardness of K-anonymous welfare-maximization problem
by a reduction from [1].
Proposition 1. [1] There is no polynomial-time c-approximation algorithm for
welfare-maximization with known valuation, when signal number is constrained,
for any constant c < ee−1 , unless P = NP .
Proof. The proof is directly from [1].
Theorem 1. There is no polynomial-time c-approximation algorithm for welfare-
maximization with known valuation and K-anonymous constraint, for any con-
stant c < ee−1 , unless P = NP .
Proof. Prove by contradiction. Assume there is a c-approximation algorithm
for c < ee−1 .
Given any signal number-constraint problem instance I with input m,S, Vij ,
m is the number of items, S is signal number constraint, Vij = vi,jpj . W.l.o.g,
we assume Vij are all integer values by scaling (for the proof of [1] still applies
when vi,jpj are rational number). We denote OPT as the optimal solution. We
can assume there are exactly S bundles(signals) in OPT as b1, b2, ..., bS since
we can split bundles without decreasing welfare if bundle (signal) number is less
than S.
We create a new instance for K-anonymous signaling IK . SetK = dm−S2 +1e,
items are m old items plus K · S − m + K − 1 new items, bidders are n old
bidders plus K ·S−m+K− 1 new bidders. The ith new bidder only positively
values the ith new item with 1S , and values the other items zero.
Notice K ·S−m+K− 1=K · (S+ 1)−m− 1 is non-negative for any S > 0.
Since:
K · (S+ 1)−m−1 ≥ (m− S
2
+ 1)(S+ 1)−m−1 ≥ m−S+ (S+ 1)−m−1 = 0
We denote OPT
′
as the optimal solution of instance IK .
Lemma 1.
∑
bi∈OPT (bi −K)+ < K
Proof. Assume left-hand side ≥ K, let c the number of bundles that exceeds K
items. Then there are S − c bundles with at least one item but less than K + 1
items.
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When c = 0 the lemma holds obviously, when c > 0 we have
m ≥ c ·K +K + S − c (1)
≥ c · m− S
2
+
m− S
2
+ c+ 1 + s− c (2)
≥ m− S + c+ 1 + s− c = m+ 1 (3)
Contradiction. The second inequality holds by substituting K = m−S2 + 1, the
third inequality holds for c > 0.
Lemma 2. OPT
′ ≥ OPT
Proof. Since the total number of items are K ·S+K−1 and∑bi∈OPT (bi−K)+ <
K, we can fill bundles bi < K by new items and fix bundles bj ≥ K, making each
bundle size not smaller than K. Thus we can achieve at least welfare OPT .
Partition OPT
′
into 2 kinds of bundles A = {a1, ..., at1}, C = {c1, ..., ct2}.
A bundle is in C if and only if all of its items are new items. t1 + t2 ≤ S since
the total number of items is K · S + K − 1. Winners in A are all old bidders
since new bidder can value a bundle at most 1/S but at least one old bidder
value the bundle ≥ 1. On the other hand, each bundle in C is valued at most
1/S, and t2 < S, thus sum of welfare in C is less than (S − 1)/S.
Remove all new items in OPT
′
, we will obtain a feasible solution OPT
′′
for I.
We only lose welfare in C which is at most (S − 1)/S.Thus OPT ′′ > OPT − 1.
Since Vij are all integers, we have OPT
′′
= OPT . Therefore, we obtain a
c-approximation algorithm for welfare-maximization with signal number con-
straint, for c < e/(e− 1). Contradiction.
3.2 2e/(e− 1) Approximation Algorithm
We provide a 2e/(e − 1) Approximation Algorithm by incorporate result from
[1]
Proposition 2. [1] For cardinality constrained signaling with known valuations,
there is a randomized, polynomial-time, e/(e − 1)-approximation algorithm for
computing the welfare-maximizing signaling scheme.
Proof. The proof is directly from [1].
Theorem 2. For K-anonymous signaling with known valuations, there is a
randomized, polynomial-time, 2e/(e−1)-approximation algorithm for computing
the welfare-maximizing signaling scheme.
Proof. Given a K-anonymous signaling instance IK , we set S as bm/Kc and
solve cardinality constrained signaling problem, without K-anonymous con-
straint.
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After obtain the solution ALG, assume set A has t signals, each of which
has less than K items: A = {a1, a2, ..., at}, set B has bm/Kc − t signals, each
of which has no less than K items: B =
{
b1, b2, ..., bbm/Kc−t
}
.
If welfare of B is no less than half of the total welfare, then we are done.
Otherwise, A’s welfare will be larger than half of the total value. We can fill
each a by B’s items, since items left is no less than m − (a1 + ... + at) ≥
k · t− (a1 + ...+ at). Then we can obtain A’s welfare in a feasible solution, it is
also a 2e/(e− 1) approximation.
We show the solution of algorithm above can be only half of the optimum.
Example 1. There are K2 +K items and K+2 bidders. Bidder A values each
of the first K2 items for 1/K. And bidder Bi values the K
2 + ith item for 1
and others zero. Bidder C value each of the last K items for 1− K .
The optimal solution’s welfare is 2K − , by giving first K2 items to A and
last K items to C. But the algorithm’s best welfare can be at most K + 1, since
Bi will win in ALG. The gap approaches to 2 as K goes to infinity.
3.3 Special Cases
Given some extra assumption, we can calculate the optimal solution for welfare
maximization in polynomial time.
3.3.1 Signals Number Constraint
We constrain the number of signals being used as a constant, and propose an
algorithm that optimally solve the problem in polynomial time. It consists of 3
steps as below:
1. Enumerate signals number and signals’ winners. This only cost O(nc)
time.
2. Remove bidders who won no signal, making each item chosen by bidder
who favors it most. After this step, the ith bidder get ki items. This
scheme achieve the best social welfare, yet some winner may win less than
k items.
3. Use cost flow technique to find the best allocation which satisfy the K-
anonymous constraint. The graph is shown in the figure 1, arcs are de-
scribed as (l, u, c), l is the lower bound of flow, u is the upper bound, c is
the cost per flow. wi and wi′ correspond to the ith bidder, itemj corre-
sponds to the jth item. Arc from st to wi represents the initial number
of items of bidder i is ki. Arc from w
′
i to end represents the final items
of bidder i should be no less than k. Arc from w
′
i to itemj represent i
can give its itemj to others, leading a welfare decrease of vij . Arc from
itemk to wi represents that bidder i can gain itemk from others, leading a
welfare increase of vij . By solving the minimum cost feasible flow problem
[6], we can obtain final optimal allocation.
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Figure 1: Cost Flow
3.3.2 Value Constraint
In this subsection, we propose a setting that the value of bidder i to item j Vij
can be expressed as pi · qj + bi. A dynamic programming approach is given that
solve it in polynomial-time.
Lemma 3. Given any instance of K-anonymous signaling problem, there always
exists an optimal signaling scheme that, sort signal winners {w1, w2, ..., wt} by
pi in non-decreasing order. ∀i < j, pi 6= pj, for any category ti points to wi’s
signal, and any category tj points to wj’s signal, qti ≥ qtj .
Proof. Given any optimal signaling scheme, assume there exists i < j, pi 6=
pj , qk > ql such that wi possesses ql and wj possesses qk. After swap qk and ql.
The welfare change is
piqk + pjql − (piql + pjqk) = pi(qk − ql)− pj(qk − ql) (4)
= (pi − pj)(qk − ql) ≥ 0 (5)
Finally we obtain an optimal signaling scheme that satisfies the lemma by re-
peatedly swapping.
Thus we can sort bidders(items) with respect to pi(qj). Building state
F (i, j), which means the best welfare for bidders {1, 2, ..., i}, items {1, 2, ..., j}.
F (i, j) = max

F (i− 1, j)
F (i, j − 1)
F (i− 1, j −K1) +K1 · bi + (
∑j
t=j−K1+1 qt)pi
(6)
K1 are the enumerated number of items that bidder i will win, K1 ≥ K. The
optimal solution is F (n,m). The complexity is O(nm2).
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4 Revenue Maximization
4.1 Hardness Result
Theorem 3. Even when the signals number is constant, it is still NP-hard to
solve the revenue maximization problem in K-anonymous constraint setting.
Lemma 4. It is NP-hard to partition 2n integers {x1, ..., x2n} into two sets
with size n, such that the two subsets’ element sum are the same.
Proof. Without size n constraint, it is a classical NP-Complete problem(Subset
Sum [5]) that we want to find a subset whose sum is
∑
i xi
2 .
Proof by contradiction, assume that the new problem has polynomial time
solution. For any Subset Sum problem instance with n integers, we can add n
zeros and transfer it into the new problem. By finding two sets with size n and
the sum are the same, we can remove zeros and obtain a solution for Subset
Sum, contradiction.
Proof. Assume the revenue optimization can be polynomially solved. For any
instance of Subset Sum Problem with Size K − 1 constraint(partition 2K − 2
integers into two K − 1-size sets with the same sum), SSPS. We denote the
sum of all integers as W and raise an auction: There are 3 bidders, 2K items,
signal’s support size should be no less than K. the value matrix shows in table
below:
Item
W
2
Bidder W2
x1 x2 ... x2K−2
Signal number can be at most 2. When signal number is one, the revenue
can be at most W2 .
When signal number is two, if there exists a solution {S1, S2} of SSPS, we
can bundle item {1 ∪ S1} and {2 ∪ S2}, achieve revenue W . Since any bundle
can achieve value at most W/2, this is optimal.
When there is no solution for SSPS, given any signaling scheme with 2
signals, if items 1, 2 are not in the same signal, the revenue is strictly less than
W . When 1, 2 are in the same signal s1, s1’s revenue is W/2 and s2’s revenue is
strictly less than W/2. Therefore, the optimal revenue is strictly less than W .
From all above, the optimal revenue of the auction is W if and only if there
exists a solution of SSPS, Contradict with the fact that Subset Sum problem is
NP-hard.
Remark 1. This proof’s rough thought is coincidentally similar to the proof of
NP-Hardness of revenue maximization when K-anonymous constraint does not
exists. [2]
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4.2 Approximation Approach
[1] independently gives a randomized mechanism for approximating revenue in
cardinality constraint setting, we independently give an deterministic approx-
imation algorithm for K-anonymous setting with similar yet different analysis
(Since the valuation is known in prior, an algorithm is sufficient to extract rev-
enue).
Theorem 4. We can achieve 3β-approximation in revenue maximization prob-
lem with K-anonymous constraint, when there is a β-approximation for welfare
maximization problem.
Proof. We prove that we can transfer welfare maximization result into revenue
maximization.
Fix two parameters β and α, we firstly find the β-approximate optimal sig-
naling scheme S for welfare maximization in K-anonymous constraint. Denote
Vi as the ith bidder’s welfare contribution in S. Let V
∗ = max(Vi), OPTW as
the social welfare of scheme S, and OPT as the optimal revenue we can achieve,
obviously OPTW ≥ OPT . We first sort bidders according to Vi.
• If V ∗ ≤ βOPTW , merge the 1st and the 2nd bidders’ signal, 3rd and 4th
bidders’ bundles, and so on. We can at least achieve 1−β2 OPT revenue
without violate K-anonymous constraint.
• We denote OPTW (−i∗) as the best social welfare we can achieve when
the first bidder i∗ has been removed(signaling scheme is S
′
). Obviously,
OPTW (−i∗) ≥ OPT . We further denote V ′∗ as the max welfare an
individual bidder can contribute in OPTW (−i∗).
If V ∗ ≥ βOPTW and V ′∗ ≤ αOPTW (−i∗), In signaling scheme S′ , we
merge the 1st and the 2nd bidders’ signals, 3rd and 4th bidders’ signals,
and so on. We can at least achieve 1−α2 OPT revenue.
• Otherwise, sell all items in one signal, we can at least achieve min(α, β)OPT
revenue.
Setting α = β = 13 , we achieve a
1
3 competitive ratio.
Corollary 1. For K-anonymous signaling with known valuations, there is a
randomized, polynomial-time, 6e/(e−1)-approximation algorithm for computing
the revenue-maximizing signaling scheme.
5 Future Work
An α-approximation algorithm for welfare maximization problem that ee−1 ≤
α < 2ee−1 is the first direction that we may keep working on.
The second future direction is to develop better approximation algorithm for
revenue maximization independently, without transferring welfare maximization
results.
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Finally, our work only focus on signaling schemes that φ(j, S) ∈ {0, 1}. In
probabilistic setting with mixed signal that mentioned in [3], new K-anonymous
signaling scheme setting may be proposed, and we may get other useful approx-
imation algorithms or even an optimal one.
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